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The program on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest
Degradation (REDD+) is one of the major attempts to tackle climate
change mitigation in developing countries. REDD+ seeks to provide
result-based incentives to promote emission reductions and increase
carbon sinks in forest land while promoting other cobenefits, such
as the conservation of biodiversity. We model different scenarios of
international REDD+ funds distribution toward potential recipient
countries using 2 carbon emission reduction targets (20% and 50%
compared to the baseline scenario, i.e., deforestation and forest
degradation without REDD+) by 2030. The model combines the
prioritization of environmental outcomes in terms of carbon seques-
tration and biodiversity conservation and social equity, accounting
for the equitable distribution of international REDD+ funds. Results
highlight the synergy between carbon sequestration and biodiver-
sity conservation under alternative fund allocation criteria, espe-
cially for scenarios of low carbon emission reduction. Trade-offs
increase when distributional equity is considered as an additional
criterion, especially under higher equity requirements. The analysis
helps to better understand the inherent trade-offs between enhanc-
ing distributional equity and meeting environmental targets under
alternative REDD+ fund allocation options.
climate change | REDD+ | trade-offs | biodiversity | equity
Planning toward meeting environmental goals requires theintegration of ecological and social aspects. However, social
aspects related to conservation decisions have been particularly
elusive (1–3). Among these aspects, social equity, one of the
pillars of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), stands as
a key political criterion. However, efforts to effectively integrate
equity considerations into environmental goals have been limited
(4, 5). Only recently integrated modeling approaches have been
able to show how addressing equity might affect biodiversity
conservation goals (6) and climate mitigation targets (7). These
are 2 of the most pressing global policy issues of our time (8) and
can have feedback effects on economic inequality (9).
Deforestation and forest degradation currently account for up
to 10% of the global greenhouse gas emissions (10). Avoiding
deforestation and forest degradation is generally seen as a
relatively low-cost abatement option (11) as well as critical
element to reduce biodiversity loss (12). The international
program about Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and
Forest Degradation (REDD+) was created by the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)
in 2007 at the 13th Conference of the Parties. The program has
continuously evolved in order to promote environmental cobenefits,
and it introduces social safeguards, reflected in the “plus,” including
the role of conservation and sustainable management of forests, and
enhancement of forest carbon stocks.
All this has resulted in a complex financial landscape (13).
Several initiatives focus on the readiness process to scale up
REDD+, and so far, REDD+ has mainly focused on a so-called
“phase I,” consisting in developing a global strategy, supported
by financial grants, that include creating guidelines, capacity de-
velopment at country level, and strengthening forest-monitoring
approaches (14). Currently, several developing countries have
finished phase I and are starting phase II, which consists in the
implementation of national policies or action plans. Only a few
countries are in the position of receiving “phase III” results-
based payments (RBPs) through bilateral and multilateral pro-
cesses. The Green Climate Fund (GCF) has already raised over
10 billion US$ from 43 state governments (a call of 500 million
US$ was recently opened in 2018), and, according to the 2015
Paris Agreement, the GCF “expects” to mobilize 100 billion US$
per year by 2020 (15).
Although the main focus of REDD+ is on carbon, there is
increased interest in its associated cobenefits and trade-offs (16–
20). Previous work on global REDD+ fund allocation estimated
that including biodiversity as a criterion for the RBP allocation
would significantly protect species richness without compromising
“carbon efficiency” (21). However, the REDD+ program has also
raised various concerns, especially regarding social aspects such as
how REDD+ might affect social equity in its various dimensions
(22–26). This question is particularly important because potential
REDD+ country beneficiaries with a high proportion of their
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rural population in poverty are also highly vulnerable to the im-
pacts of climate change (27).
Social equity is a key political component in climate negotiations
and climate governance planning. However, the incorporation of
distributional equity in REDD+ fund allocation analysis to eval-
uate trade-offs and synergies with carbon efficiency at the global
scale is lacking. This is also a knowledge gap regarding biodiversity
conservation studies, as there are relatively few quantitative as-
sessments on how the incorporation of social equity as an alloca-
tive criterion of global biodiversity conservation funds might affect
global conservation outcomes (6). From the 3 main dimensions of
social equity (recognition, procedural and distributional equity)
(26), we focus here on distributional equity impacts of REDD+
allocation rules, to evaluate its potential trade-offs with carbon
sequestration and biodiversity conservation (28).
Implementing environmentally effective, economically efficient
and socially equitable (3E+) REDD+ faces multiple challenges
(29). Here, we present a global model based on the reference
point method (30) that allows the evaluation of different inter-
national REDD+ funds allocation scenarios considering carbon
emission reduction from avoiding deforestation (scenario 1),
biodiversity conservation (scenario 2), and the implementation of
distributional equity rules (scenario 3). The model is run for the 3
scenarios with total budgets associated with carbon emission re-
duction of 20% and 50% compared to the baseline scenario, i.e.,
deforestation and forest degradation without REDD+. The model
is based on multiobjective linear programming formulations de-
veloped at country level (Materials and Methods and SI Appendix).
We evaluate how the incorporation of biodiversity conservation
and distributional equity targets creates synergies and trade-offs
that can impact on carbon emission reduction outcomes. We ex-
plored 2 alternative equity rules: a “max–min” rule that prioritizes
the allocation of REDD+ funds to the poorest countries (scenario
3A), given the higher vulnerability of poor countries to the impacts
of climate change (31, 32); and an “egalitarian” distributional eq-
uity rule based on distributing international REDD+ funds equally
among all potential recipient countries (scenario 3B).
Results
Synergies between Forest-Based Carbon Emission Reduction and
Biodiversity Conservation. The results of scenario 1, maximization
of carbon sequestration (for a given REDD+ budget, obtaining the
highest possible carbon sequestration globally), and scenario 2,
maximization of biodiversity conservation (for a given REDD+
budget, achieving the highest possible number of species conserved
globally), are shown in Fig. 1. Scenario 1 (blue line) and scenario
2 (red line) show a strong correlation, suggesting potential for
synergetic outcomes in different international REDD+ fund al-
location scenarios. The proximity among the curves suggests that
the extra financial cost of optimizing biodiversity conservation is
moderate. For small reductions in carbon emissions (i.e., carbon
emissions reduced by less than 20%), biodiversity cobenefits can
be achieved at relatively low economic costs. For a reduction of
global forest carbon emissions larger than 20%, carbon and
biodiversity are still correlated but the costs of obtaining bio-
diversity cobenefits are higher.
The estimated REDD+ budget required for a global reduction
in carbon emissions of 20% and 50% with respect to a business
as usual scenario (i.e., no REDD+), and the number of endemic
species that would be lost in each of the REDD+ fund allocation
scenarios is shown in Table 1. The model suggests that for a global
reduction of carbon emissions of 20%, maximizing biodiversity
conservation (i.e., conserving the highest possible number of spe-
cies globally) would cost 86% more than if REDD+ only focused
on abating forest carbon emissions, that is, without taking bio-
diversity conservation into account as a side objective. Optimizing
the allocation of funds to also maximize biodiversity cobenefits
while reducing by 20% emissions from deforestation and forest
degradation would allow saving of 20% more birds, 17% more
amphibians, and 29% more mammals compared to a “carbon-
only” REDD scenario 1. For a 50% carbon emission reduction
target, the cost of maximizing biodiversity conservation is more
than 2 times the cost of not considering biodiversity as a side
objective, but the number of species that would be saved would
increase significantly (Table 1).
Trade-Offs across Carbon Emission Reduction, Biodiversity Conservation,
and Social Equity. The effects of including equity considerations in
the distribution of REDD+ funds are shown in Fig. 2 for the 2
fixed budgets that correspond to carbon emissions reduction of
20% and 50% as regards scenario 1. The baseline (black curve)
indicates the relation between biodiversity conservation and
carbon emission reduction without any consideration for distri-
butional equity. Any point within the curve corresponds to an
optimized solution for carbon and biodiversity. Considering eq-
uity to a small extent, that is, distributing a small share of the
total budget across countries based on an equity rule (E = 0.25;
implying 25% of the budget being distributed according to ful-
filling an equity rule; green curve), would not lead to a major loss
in carbon emission reduction or biodiversity conservation, as the
green curve is relatively close to the black curve and has a similar
shape. However, when the majority of funds are distributed
following an equity rule instead of environmental criteria (i.e.,
E = 0.75; yellow curve), this would imply a higher trade-off
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Fig. 1. Response of carbon emissions and biodiversity loss to different REDD+ budget levels. (A) Percentage of carbon emissions under REDD+ relative to the
baseline (i.e., no REDD+) (y axis) for different global REDD+ budget levels (x axis). The red line stands above the blue line as for the same REDD+ budget
the maximization of biodiversity conservation results in higher carbon emissions globally. (B) Percentage of biodiversity loss under REDD+ (y axis) relative to
the baseline for different REDD+ budget levels (x axis). In both panels, the blue line represents optimized levels for carbon sequestration (scenario 1) and the
red line represents optimized levels for biodiversity conservation (scenario 2).
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between carbon and biodiversity objectives, as reducing forest
carbon emissions would imply larger biodiversity losses due to the
steep concave shape of the curve. Both for a large budget (Fig. 2A)
and low budget (Fig. 2B), maximizing equity (E = 1) results in
significantly higher carbon emissions and biodiversity loss.
The relative loss of carbon efficiency and of biodiversity con-
servation when incorporating different levels of equity in the
distribution of REDD+ funds among countries are shown in Fig.
3. In both cases (for a reduction target of 20% and 50% in forest
carbon emissions), relatively small increases in distributional
equity (E = 0.25) are associated with a relatively small increase in
carbon emissions and biodiversity loss. In contrast, when funds
are allocated considering solely equity criteria, large losses in
carbon efficiency and species conservation emerge. For a REDD+
budget equivalent to 20% carbon emissions reduction, considering
equity at the level E = 1 would lead to a scenario in which carbon
emissions would only be reduced by 5% (instead of 20% if no
equity rule was considered), and the percentage of species lost
compared to a scenario without REDD+ would increase from 72
to 87%. For the larger REDD+ budget associated with a 50%
forest carbon emission reduction, total prioritization of equity
(E = 1) would imply that carbon emissions be reduced by 16%
(instead of 50%), and the percentage of species lost compared to
the baseline scenario would be 75% (instead of 53%).
Scenarios of Global REDD+ Funds Allocation across Countries for Carbon,
Biodiversity, and Equity. The optimized distribution of international
REDD+ funds given a low and high budget levels for the 3 sce-
narios: scenario 1 (maximization of carbon emission reduction),
scenario 2 (maximization of biodiversity conservation), scenario 3A
(application of a “max–min distribution rule” with countries re-
ceiving a share of total REDD+ funds based on their relative in-
come poverty levels, with a fixed equity level at E = 0.25), and
scenario 3B (the “egalitarian distribution rule” with a share of the
Table 1. Model results in terms of carbon emissions and biodiversity loss per year across REDD+ budget optimization scenarios
REDD+ Scenarios
No. of bird species
lost per year, %
birds lost relative to
the baseline
No. of amphibian species
lost per year, %
amphibians lost
relative to the
baseline
No. of mammal
species lost per
year, % mammals lost
relative to the baseline
Billion tons of forest
carbon emissions per
year, % of total emission
relative to the baseline
Total funds
required, billion US$
Yes Scenario 1 for a
20% carbon
emissions
reduction
7 (93.75) 17 (76.39) 7 (90.44) 2.17 (80.15) 220
Yes Scenario 2 for a
20% carbon
emissions
reduction
5 (72.48) 12 (59.18) 5 (61.61) 2.16 (80.14) 410
Yes Scenario 1 for a
50% carbon
emissions
reduction
5 (67.56) 9 (48.49) 4 (47.59) 1.36 (50.10) 970
Yes Scenario 2 for a
50% carbon
emissions
reduction
3 (42.17) 4 (21.05) 2 (27.62) 1.38 (50.86) 2,000
No Baseline (BAU) 8 (100) 22 (100) 8 (100) 2.71 (100) 0
Scenario 1 (maximization of carbon sequestration) and scenario 2 (maximization of biodiversity conservation) for global REDD+ budgets associated with
20% and 50% carbon emissions reductions. Biodiversity impacts are measured in terms of the number of lost species of birds, amphibians, and mammals. The
bottom row represents the baseline scenario, in which the REDD+ program is not implemented. BAU, business as usual.
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Fig. 2. Trade-offs between the reduction of carbon emissions and the conservation of biodiversity for different levels of equity in the global distribution of
REDD+ funds. Equity not included (E = 0). Equity included via a percentage of the total funds allocated according to various equity levels: E = 0.25 (25% of
funds distributed according to the max–min equity rule), E = 0.50 (50% of funds distributed according to the max–min equity rule), E = 0.75 (75%), and E = 1
(100%). (A) Fixed budget corresponding to a 50% carbon emission reduction compared to the baseline (i.e., no REDD+ program implemented); and (B) fixed
budget corresponding to a 20% carbon emission reduction compared to the baseline. The figure shows how for increasing levels of equity in the distribution
of REDD+ funds (from nonconsideration of equity E = 0, to having all funds distributed under an equity rule, E = 1), the trade-offs between reducing carbon
emissions and biodiversity conservation tend to increase.
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total budget distributed equally among all potential receiving
countries, with E = 0.25) is shown in Fig. 4. In the case of the lower
REDD+ budget under scenario 1, the model selects first those
countries with the highest ratio of deforestation and carbon density
to forest conservation opportunity costs, resulting in the selection
of several African countries such as Tanzania, Mozambique,
Guinea, Namibia, Zimbabwe, as well as Argentina in South
America (Fig. 4A). For the same emissions reduction target, under
scenario 2, the model selects a few more countries, including
Honduras, Madagascar, Seychelles, Colombia, and Mauritius,
which are considered biodiversity hot spots (Fig. 4B). In the case of
using the larger budget, the model covers up to 13 countries, both
under scenario 1 (Fig. 4C) and scenario 2 (Fig. 4D). The main
difference between both scenarios is that, when biodiversity is
maximized (Fig. 4D), the model selects more countries from South
and Latin America such as Colombia, Mexico, Ecuador, and
Panama, which contain very high biodiversity levels. The incor-
poration of an equity criterion implies a larger number of recipient
countries, 50 under the max–min approach (Fig. 4E) and 51 under
the egalitarian approach (Fig. 4F). The main difference between
these 2 allocative models is that, under the egalitarian distributive
approach, the funds are more evenly distributed across countries,
while under the max–min approach, poorer countries, such as
Bangladesh, India, Madagascar, Nigeria, and Seychelles, receive a
relatively larger share of the total REDD+ budget.
Discussion
The interactions between the SDGs, especially among climate
action (SDG 13) and others such as life on land (SDG 15), and
reducing social inequalities (SDG 10), is an issue of increasing
debate (33), but quantifying trade-offs across these SDGs in a
spatially explicit way has been elusive. Within conservation science
prioritizing the allocation of global conservation efforts is a re-
current topic (34, 35). Here, we present the results of a model with
performance guarantees associated with alternative fund alloca-
tion options, which includes ecological and social aspects simul-
taneously (carbon, biodiversity, and equity). Including equity
(under 2 different distributional rules, i.e., max–min and egali-
tarian rules) results in the selection of a larger number of fund-
recipient countries, which is aligned with the inclusive spirit of the
UNFCCC. This also allows our model to select more countries to
protect endemism and profiting from the high slope of the species-
area relationship across different countries, even in cases in which
the amount of allocated land under REDD+ program in some
countries might be relatively small. Our results contribute to the
debate about the extent of trade-offs between climate change
mitigation, biodiversity conservation, and social equity under
multilateral environmental efforts and policies (7). Considering
different equity rules leads to rather different outcomes, confirming
the need to transparently set political criteria underpinning equity
and fairness in global REDD+ funds allocation. Such transparency
should help deal with ethical dilemmas in allocation decisions of
policy makers in the fields of biodiversity conservation and climate
change (36).
Allocation of REDD+ funds for forest conservation demands
making hard decisions, especially involving countries with high
development priorities. Transparent analytical models, which can
present synergies and trade-offs between ecological and societal
objectives, are thus necessary to inform decisions over budget al-
location options (37). Our model can be run quickly (∼5 min for
computation under average computer power), allowing partici-
patory processes to jointly assess trade-offs with decision makers
and other stakeholder groups with different interests and identify
cost-effective and socially acceptable fund allocation options.
Our main results concur with previous studies that forest
carbon emission reduction potential and biodiversity conserva-
tion are positively correlated (38), although this correlation does
vary (39). We suggest that the correlation decreases as carbon
emissions are abated beyond ∼20% relative to the business-
as-usual scenario while also confirming that the relationship
between optimal carbon abatement and biodiversity conserva-
tion is nonlinear (40).
Most of the existing studies that link carbon and biodiversity
objectives do not take into consideration social outcomes of
potential interventions, including via REDD+. This has the po-
tential to undermine conservation projects (28, 41), as could
happen if equity is not explicitly considered in climate and
biodiversity governance (42). The distribution of international
REDD+ funds without proper account of distributional equity
concerns held by potential recipient countries may result in po-
litically unacceptable outcomes that may question the fairness of
global institutions from an environmental justice perspective
(43). This could be the case if no measures are adopted before
large countries that can cope with the important readiness costs
begin to receive REDD+ funds from international donors. Some
big REDD+ countries such as Brazil are already well advanced
in their progress toward starting to receive them.
The transparent consideration of equity in the distribution of
conservation funds as well as assessing the outcomes in terms of
carbon efficiency and biodiversity conservation is increasingly
needed in conservation practice (36). The “frontier solutions” in
which trade-offs are minimized (7) are also present in our study
at relatively low levels of equity. However, it is also worth noting
that while carbon inefficiencies in the short term may increase as
distributional equity increases, the model is not capable of en-
visaging second-order effects of considering equity in the longer
term, given that efficiency and equity are likely interdependent in
the medium to the longer term via political processes (28).
Our model shows that the explicit incorporation of distribu-
tional equity in the way REDD+ funds are allocated could lead
A
B
Carbon emissions compared to the baseline (%) (primary y-axis)
Species lost compared to the baseline (%) (primary y-axis)
Carbon emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (billion
tons) (secondary y-axis)
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
Equity (0%) Equity (25%) Equity (50%) Equity (75%) Equity (100%)
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
Equity (0%) Equity (25%) Equity (50%) Equity (75%) Equity (100%)
Fig. 3. Effects of considering different equity levels in the allocation of
international REDD+ funds on forest carbon emissions and biodiversity loss
per year compared to the baseline (i.e., no REDD+ program implemented).
(A) Fixed budget corresponding to a 50% carbon emissions reduction com-
pared to the baseline; and (B) fixed budget corresponding to a 20% carbon
emissions reduction compared to the baseline.
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to a larger number of recipient countries, thus, if adequately
implemented, contributing in many poor countries to covering
the readiness implementation gap (44). For species-based bio-
diversity conservation, previous studies have found that distrib-
uting funds across a larger number of species can provide better
outcomes (45). However, the prior preparation by some coun-
tries before receiving any result-based payment is a key element
in order to achieve equitable outcomes under REDD+ (46).
Achieving successful REDD+ implementation requires a certain
institutional environment within countries (47) and poverty
challenges can undermine REDD+ outcomes (48). It is thus
necessary to address the underlying causes of deforestation,
which are often related to poverty and weak institutional context
and governance (49). Incorporating equity in REDD+ fund ne-
gotiations might also imply bringing countries with potentially
less developed institutions and larger inequalities within them
into the REDD+ arena. Here, it is fundamental to respect REDD+
safeguards, such as the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. There is a
fund-absorption capacity of countries to use REDD+ funds, which
our model does not account for. In this regard, previous experi-
ences have found that countries needed twice the time estimated
to absorb the funds given different absorption capacities.
Various assumptions affect the results of the model and indicate
the need for further research. First, we used the Global Forest
Assessment data from the Food and Agriculture Organization of
the United Nations (FAO) for forest cover and forested protected
areas, although in this database each country provides data based
on a different definition of forest and missing values are com-
pleted by extrapolation. We assumed economic opportunity costs
of forest conservation at country level without considering spatial
variations within countries. However, this should not affect signif-
icantly trade-offs at the global scale considering the large number of
countries included in the study. Unfortunately, without spatially
explicit data on opportunity costs, we were not able to indicate the
exact location of forest protection in each country. Further studies
using spatially explicit opportunity costs would probably allocate
funds to a larger number of countries, as some parts of countries
would have lower opportunity costs than the average we used for
each country. Last, new research should also focus on assessing the
extent to which more equitable approaches, despite resulting in
carbon and biodiversity inefficiencies in the short term, could in the
medium to longer term catalyze more effective, legitimate, and
sustainable REDD+ processes within a larger number of countries
and therefore be more successful toward meeting the SDGs.
Materials and Methods
Identifying the best possible allocation of funds considering carbon se-
questration, biodiversity conservation, and equity requires doing optimal
planning according to a precisemodel that includes areas dynamics (available
land for deforestation and protected area), protected areas’ implementation
costs, and criteria (carbon, biodiversity, and equity) expressions formulations
(functions of available land and protected areas). Having several criteria
demands generating Pareto frontiers (the set of all existing Pareto efficient
allocations) given different REDD+ budgets. Given this model, finding an
optimal planning is a hard task because the number of all possible planning
is infinite. To tackle this problem, we developed a multiobjective optimiza-
tion model, based on a linear programming approach, that provides optimal
solutions within less than 1% of errors (more details in SI Appendix). In our
model, the opportunity costs per country determined the cost of imple-
menting protected areas and equivalates the funds received by each coun-
try. Conversely to previous studies, we did not use a single-objective
optimization heuristic to generate solutions, but a multiobjective exact op-
timization approach, so we did not need to reimplement the solutions af-
terward as the guarantee that our approach is optimal (within 1% of error)
is provided by the modeling approach. The various datasets used to feed the
optimization model are described in the following lines.
Deforestation. We used the latest dataset from the Global Forest Resource
Assessment from the FAO for information on forest cover, above ground
biomass and surface of forest protected for the years 1990, 2000, 2005, 2010,
and 2015 per country. With this data, we estimated the deforestation rate in
each country and we projected it using an exponential smoothing algorithm
to obtain the deforestation rates for the period 2016 to 2030. To estimate
carbon emissions, we used the carbon density of above-ground biomass per
country from the FAO.
Fig. 4. Global distributions of REDD+ funds under different budget optimization scenarios: (A) scenario 1A, maximization of carbon emission reduction
under a 20% emissions reduction-based budget; (B) scenario 2A, maximization of biodiversity conservation under a 20% emissions reduction budget; (C)
scenario 1B, maximization of carbon emission reduction under a 50% emissions reduction budget; (D) scenario 2B, maximization of biodiversity conservation
under a 50% emissions reduction budget; (E) scenario 3A, incorporation of equity (at level E = 0.25) under a max–min distributional rule under a 20%
emissions reduction budget; and (F) scenario 3B, incorporation of equity (level E = 0.25) under the egalitarian distributional rule under a 20% emissions
reduction budget.
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Biodiversity. To compute the main parameters of the biodiversity conserva-
tion criteria expression, we evaluated the number of species going extinct in
various deforestation scenarios, as done in previous studies (21). We used the
numbers of endemic forest dwelling species of birds, mammals, and am-
phibians in every country that were provided by the International Union for
the Conservation of Nature (IUCN).
Opportunity Costs.Opportunity costs were used to estimate the cost of setting
aside a certain amount of land as protected area (and therefore protected
from deforestation). Since there are not any robust global estimates of
spatially explicit opportunity costs, we used the agricultural opportunity cost
as a proxy variable. To estimate the average agricultural opportunity costs in
each country from 2001 to 2013, we used the countries’ gross value of ag-
ricultural production (in 2017 US dollar values) and the agricultural areas in
each country (in hectares) of the FAO. We then projected these values to
estimate future opportunity costs using an exponential smoothing algorithm.
Poverty. We took the number of people living below 1.90 purchasing power
parity dollars per day in each country as a proxy for poverty, which we used
to assign funds to different countries under the max–min equity rule. We
used the last value available in the World Bank Database since 2006 for each
country. Then we estimated the percentage of poor population living in
each selected country.
Eligible Countries. The countries eligible to receive REDD+ funds were the
nonannex 1 countries of the UNFCCC. Since poverty, opportunity costs,
forest protected areas, carbon density, and biodiversity data were
not available for all of the eligible countries, we excluded further
countries from the analysis, mostly small island countries. A total of 51
countries was included in the final dataset. None of the major emitter
countries was excluded. The model description and operation are described
in SI Appendix.
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